46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'05) Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA October 23-October 25 ISBN: 0-7695-2468-0
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/SFCS.2005.64
Secure Computation essentially guarantees that whatever computation n players can do with the help of a trusted party, they can also do by themselves. Fundamentally, however, this notion depends on the honesty of at least some players. We put forward and implement a stronger notion, Rational Secure Computation, that does not depend on player honesty, but solely on player rationality. The key to our implementation is showing that the ballotbox -the venerable device used throughout the world to tally secret votes securely can actually be used to securely compute any function. Our work bridges the fields of Game Theory and Cryptography, and has broad implications for Mechanism Design.
Citation:
Sergei Izmalkov, Silvio Micali, Matt Lepinski, "Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design," focs, pp.585-595, 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'05), 2005 Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||