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46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'05)
On the Complexity of Two-PlayerWin-Lose Games
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
October 23-October 25
ISBN: 0-7695-2468-0
Paul Valiant, MIT, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory

The efficient computation of Nash equilibria is one of the most formidable challenges in computational complexity today. The problem remains open for two-player games. We show that the complexity of two-player Nash equilibria is unchanged when all outcomes are restricted to be 0 or 1. That is, win-or-lose games are as complex as the general case for two-player games.

Citation:
Tim Abbott, Daniel Kane, Paul Valiant, "On the Complexity of Two-PlayerWin-Lose Games," focs, pp.113-122, 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'05), 2005
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