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2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
Berkeley, CA
May 11-May 14
ISBN: 0-7695-1940-7
ASCII Text
x 
 
Dirk Balfanz, Glenn Durfee, Narendar Shankar, Diana Smetters, Jessica Staddon, Hao-Chi Wong, "Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements," Security and Privacy, IEEE Symposium on, pp. 180, 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003.
 
 
BibTex
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@article{ 10.1109/SECPRI.2003.1199336,
author = {Dirk Balfanz and Glenn Durfee and Narendar Shankar and Diana Smetters and Jessica Staddon and Hao-Chi Wong},
title = {Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements},
journal ={Security and Privacy, IEEE Symposium on},
volume = {0},
year = {2003},
issn = {1540-7993},
pages = {180},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2003.1199336},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
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TY - CONF
JO - Security and Privacy, IEEE Symposium on
TI - Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SN - 1540-7993
SP
EP
A1 - Dirk Balfanz,
A1 - Glenn Durfee,
A1 - Narendar Shankar,
A1 - Diana Smetters,
A1 - Jessica Staddon,
A1 - Hao-Chi Wong,
PY - 2003
KW - null
VL - 0
JA - Security and Privacy, IEEE Symposium on
ER -
 
Dirk Balfanz, Palo Alto Research Center
Glenn Durfee, Palo Alto Research Center
Narendar Shankar, University of Maryland
Diana Smetters, Palo Alto Research Center
Jessica Staddon, Palo Alto Research Center
Hao-Chi Wong, Palo Alto Research Center
Consider a CIA agent who wants to authenticate herself to a server, but does not want to reveal her CIA credentials unless the server is a genuine CIA outlet. Consider also that the CIA server does not want to reveal its CIA credentials to anyone but CIA agents - not even to other CIA servers.
In this paper we first show how pairing-based cryptography can be used to implement such secret handshakes. We then propose a formal definition for secure secret handshakes, and prove that our pairing-based schemes are secure under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our protocols support role-based group membership authentication, traceability, indistinguishability to eavesdroppers, unbounded collusion resistance, and forward repudiability.
Our secret-handshake scheme can be implemented as a TLS cipher suite. We report on the performance of our preliminary Java implementation.
Citation:
Dirk Balfanz, Glenn Durfee, Narendar Shankar, Diana Smetters, Jessica Staddon, Hao-Chi Wong, "Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements," sp, pp.180, 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003
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