Identifying Malicious Peers Before It?s Too Late: A Decentralized Secure Peer Sampling Service

	This Article
	Subscribers, please Login Purchase article: $19 PDF IEEE Xplore Subscribers RSS feed
	Share
	Email this Article to a friend
	Bibliographic References
	ASCII Text BibTex RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
	Add to:
	Digg Furl Spurl Blink Simpy Google Del.icio.us Y!MyWeb
	Search
	Similar Articles Articles by Gian Paolo Jesi Articles by David Hales Articles by Maarten van Steen

First International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems (SASO 2007)

Cambridge, Massachussets

July 09-July 11

ISBN: 0-7695-2906-2

	ASCII Text	x
	Gian Paolo Jesi, David Hales, Maarten van Steen, "Identifying Malicious Peers Before It?s Too Late: A Decentralized Secure Peer Sampling Service," Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems, International Conference on, pp. 237-246, First International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems (SASO 2007), 2007.

	BibTex	x
	@article{ 10.1109/SASO.2007.32, author = {Gian Paolo Jesi and David Hales and Maarten van Steen}, title = {Identifying Malicious Peers Before It?s Too Late: A Decentralized Secure Peer Sampling Service}, journal ={Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems, International Conference on}, volume = {0}, year = {2007}, isbn = {0-7695-2906-2}, pages = {237-246}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/SASO.2007.32}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, }

	RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote	x
	TY - CONF JO - Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems, International Conference on TI - Identifying Malicious Peers Before It?s Too Late: A Decentralized Secure Peer Sampling Service SN - 0-7695-2906-2 SP237 EP246 A1 - Gian Paolo Jesi, A1 - David Hales, A1 - Maarten van Steen, PY - 2007 KW - null VL - 0 JA - Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems, International Conference on ER -

Gian Paolo Jesi, University of Bologna

David Hales, University of Bologna

Maarten van Steen, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/SASO.2007.32

Many unstructured peer to peer (P2P) systems rely on a Peer Sampling Service (PSS) that returns randomly sampled nodes from the population comprising the system. PSS protocols are often implemented using "gossiping" approaches in which connected nodes exchange their links in a randomized way. However, such services can be defeated easily by malicious nodes executing "hub attacks" which distort the PSS such that all nodes in the network, ultimately, only gain access to malicious nodes. From this leading status - i.e. being a "hub" - the malicious nodes can affect the overlay in several ways, ranging from total network disruption to obtaining an application dependent advantage. We present a completely distributed defense against such attacks and give results from simulation experiments. The approach is generic as it is independent of the adopted PSS implementation.

Citation:

Gian Paolo Jesi, David Hales, Maarten van Steen, "Identifying Malicious Peers Before It?s Too Late: A Decentralized Secure Peer Sampling Service," saso, pp.237-246, First International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems (SASO 2007), 2007

Peer Review Notice | Give Us Feedback

Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use.