loading...
 This Article 
   
 Share 
   
 Bibliographic References 
   
 Add to: 
 
Digg
Furl
Spurl
Blink
Simpy
Google
Del.icio.us
Y!MyWeb
 
 Search 
   
First International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE'05)
SecSyslog: an Approach to Secure Logging Based on Covert Channels
Taipei, Taiwan
November 07-November 09
ISBN: 0-7695-2478-8
Dario V. Forte, University of Milano at Crema
Cristiano Maruti, IRItaly (Incident Response Italy) project
Michele R. Vetturi, IRItaly (Incident Response Italy) project
Michele Zambelli, IRItaly (Incident Response Italy) project
Today log traces are widely used to identify and prevent violations of corporate information systems. The most recent logging trend is to manage most level 3 ISO/OSI traffic via pcapcompatibile output. But use of syslog is still very widespread, as are the security issues it entails, especially in its 'pure' version. This paper outlines the basic syslog problems as foreseen in the RFCs, examines the 'secure' alternatives to the protocol (and relative implementations) and proposes a transmission approach based on covert channels which, applied on the LINUX platform, might answer some of the intrinsic reliability problems which undermine its effectiveness as a digital forensic tool.
Index Terms:
Log analysis, Forensic, Log Correlation, Log Integrity, Covert Channel, Spyware.
Citation:
Dario V. Forte, Cristiano Maruti, Michele R. Vetturi, Michele Zambelli, "SecSyslog: an Approach to Secure Logging Based on Covert Channels," sadfe, pp.248-263, First International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE'05), 2005
Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use.