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Fourth IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications
On the Effectiveness of Continuous-Time Mixes under Flow-Correlation Based Anonymity Attacks
Cambridge, Massachusetts
July 27-July 29
ISBN: 0-7695-2326-9
Ye Zhu, Department of Computer Science, Texas A&M University, College Station TX, USA
Xinwen Fu, Department of Computer Science, Texas A&M University, College Station TX, USA
Riccardo Bettati, Department of Computer Science, Texas A&M University, College Station TX, USA

In flow-based mix networks, so-called flow correlation attacks have been proposed earlier and have been shown empirically to seriously degrade mix-based anonymous communication systems. In this paper, we theoretically analyze the effectiveness of a mix network under flow correlation attacks. Our formulae clearly show how a mix network will ultimately fail when an adversary has access to sufficiently long flow samples, independently of the type of flows (TCP or UDP).We illustrate the analysis methodology by modeling a continuous-time mix, which randomly delays each incoming packet. Our queuingmodel- based analysis captures the essence of flow correlation attacks and can provide useful guidelines for designers who develop and deploy anonymity systems.

Citation:
Ye Zhu, Xinwen Fu, Riccardo Bettati, "On the Effectiveness of Continuous-Time Mixes under Flow-Correlation Based Anonymity Attacks," nca, pp.215-218, Fourth IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, 2005
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