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Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
January-February 2004 (vol. 2 no. 1)
pp. 38-47
ASCII Text
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David Chaum, "Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections," IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 38-47, January-February, 2004.
 
 
BibTex
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@article{ 10.1109/MSECP.2004.1264852,
author = {David Chaum},
title = {Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections},
journal ={IEEE Security and Privacy},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
issn = {1540-7993},
year = {2004},
pages = {38-47},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSECP.2004.1264852},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
x 
 
TY - MGZN
JO - IEEE Security and Privacy
TI - Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IS - 1
SN - 1540-7993
SP38
EP47
EPD - 38-47
A1 - David Chaum,
PY - 2004
KW - voter fraud
KW - voter receipts
KW - e-voting
VL - 2
JA - IEEE Security and Privacy
ER -
 

A new kind of receipt sets a far higher standard of security by letting voters verify the election outcome—even if all election computers and records were compromised. The system preserves ballot secrecy, while improving access, robustness, and adjucation, all at lower cost.

Index Terms:
voter fraud, voter receipts, e-voting
Citation:
David Chaum, "Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections," IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 38-47, Jan. 2004, doi:10.1109/MSECP.2004.1264852
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