Service-oriented peer-to-peer architectures combine the benefits of service-oriented architectures and peer-to-peer networks, such as loose coupling and scalability. They also support service composition, the combining of existing services into new ones. Until now, only composition service strategies for a single peer acting as a service composer have been investigated. Therefore, this paper investigates the market for composed services. It is shown that this market forms an oligopoly and, thus, requires incentive-compatible service pricing. In consequence, the vickrey procurement auction VETO has been developed determining the pricing mechanism in a fully distributed manner. It is proven that VETO is incentive-compatible and maximizes the market?s welfare. Furthermore, the VETO protocol is specified and it is shown that this protocol prevents collusion within the auction. Still, VETO upholds the peer-to-peer paradigm by only relying on the peers which are taking part in the auction, no additional trusted entities or super-peers are required.