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Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Forensic Analysis for Epidemic Attacks in Federated Networks
Fess parker's Doubletree, Santa Barbara, Ca, USA
November 12-November 15
ISBN: 1-4244-0593-9
Yinglian Xie, Carnegie Mellon University, ylxie@cs.cmu.edu
Vyas Sekar, Carnegie Mellon University, vyass@cs.cmu.edu
Michael Reiter, Carnegie Mellon University, reiter@cs.cmu.edu
Hui Zhang, Carnegie Mellon University, hzhang@cs.cmu.edu
We present the design of a Network Forensic Alliance (NFA), to allow multiple administrative domains (ADs) to jointly locate the origin of epidemic spreading attacks. ADs in the NFA collaborate in a distributed protocol for post-mortem analysis of worm-like attacks. Information exchange between any two participating ADs is limited to traffic records that are known to both sides, maintaining the privacy of participants. Such an architecture is incentive-compatible ? participants benefit by gaining better local investigative capabilities, even with partial deployment. Further, we show that by sharing local investigation results, ADs can achieve global investigative capabilities that are comparable to a centralized implementation with access to global traffic records. Our evaluation demonstrates that it is feasible for large-scale attack investigation to be incrementally deployed in an Internet-like federation.
Citation:
Yinglian Xie, Vyas Sekar, Michael Reiter, Hui Zhang, "Forensic Analysis for Epidemic Attacks in Federated Networks," icnp, pp.43-53, Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols, 2006
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