Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05) Pareto-Efficiency without Giving-In: A Two-Phased Protocol for Multiple-Attribute Negotiations Munich, Germany July 19-July 22 ISBN: 0-7695-2277-7
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ICECT.2005.64
Multiple-attribute contracting allows the alignment of consumers? complex demand profiles and the specific delivery capabilities of suppliers. A two-phased negotiation model is introduced that includes both self-interested negotiations driven by a heuristic strategy and a joint-gains approach to win/win-negotiations. The concept of Pareto-efficiency on imperfect markets (integrative phase) is combined with a strategy-driven, non-altruistic approach to individual utility maximization (distributive phase). The concept of an agent based market is illustrated by grid services as an example negotiation object. The outlined mechanism is evaluated using the "GeneLab" simulation environment that allows to benchmark individual utility gains.
Citation:
Florian Lang, Constantin Brunn, "Pareto-Efficiency without Giving-In: A Two-Phased Protocol for Multiple-Attribute Negotiations," cec, pp.182-189, Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05), 2005 Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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