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22nd International Conference on Data Engineering Workshops (ICDEW'06)
Finding the Leak: A Privacy Audit System for Sensitive XML Databases
Atlanta, Georgia
April 03-April 07
ISBN: 0-7695-2571-7
Stefan B?ttcher, University of Paderborn, Germany
Rita Steinmetz, University of Paderborn, Germany
Whenever private information that is legally used by multiple employees of a company has been illegally exposed to a third party, it is of significant importance to the concerned company to find the information leak in its staff for a variety of reasons, e.g., to keep confidence of its customers. In this paper, we present a privacy audit system for XML databases and the XPath query language which uses the concept of an audit query to describe the secret information. For a given audit query, our system returns a set of suspicious user queries that may have used the secret information. Suspicious user queries are identified in a sequence of four steps: first, a static analysis based on the time constraints; second, a comparison of the nodename tests of the audit query and the user queries; third, an analysis of the associations of the node-name tests found in the audit query and in the user queries; and finally, a test on ?historic data?. Furthermore, we discuss privacy violation detection in case of an attacker who submits multiple queries and externally compares the results.
Citation:
Stefan B?ttcher, Rita Steinmetz, "Finding the Leak: A Privacy Audit System for Sensitive XML Databases," icdew, pp.100, 22nd International Conference on Data Engineering Workshops (ICDEW'06), 2006
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