loading...
 This Article 
   
 Share 
   
 Bibliographic References 
   
 Add to: 
 
Digg
Furl
Spurl
Blink
Simpy
Google
Del.icio.us
Y!MyWeb
 
 Search 
   
DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition - Volume II
ANON: An IP-Layer Anonymizing Infrastructure
Washington, DC
April 22-April 24
ISBN: 0-7695-1897-4
Chen-Mou Cheng, Harvard University
H.T. Kung, Harvard University
Koan-Sin Tan, Harvard University
Scott Bradner, Harvard University
This exhibition demonstrates an IP-layer anonymizing infrastructure, called ANON, which allows server addresses to be hidden from clients and vice versa. In providing address anonymity, ANON uses a network resident set of IP-layer anonymizing forwarders that can forward IP packets with nested encryption and decryption applied to their source and destination addresses. To prevent adversaries from compromising the anonymity by learning the forwarding path, ANON incorporates a suite of countermeasures, including link padding and non-malleable, semantically secure link encryption. To prevent denial of service (DoS) attacks through the anonymizing infrastructure itself, ANON uses rate limiting. Finally, to increase the resilience against attacks and infrastructure failures, ANON uses redundant forwarders with anycast addresses and a fault-tolerant overlay network to connect forwarders.
Citation:
Chen-Mou Cheng, H.T. Kung, Koan-Sin Tan, Scott Bradner, "ANON: An IP-Layer Anonymizing Infrastructure," discex, vol. 2, pp.78, DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition - Volume II, 2003
Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use.