Do As I SaY! Programmatic Access Control with Explicit Identities

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20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'07)

Venice, Italy

July 06-July 08

ISBN: 0-7695-2819-8

	ASCII Text	x
	Andrew Cirillo, Radha Jagadeesan, Corin Pitcher, James Riely, "Do As I SaY! Programmatic Access Control with Explicit Identities," Computer Security Foundations Symposium, IEEE, pp. 16-30, 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'07), 2007.

	BibTex	x
	@article{ 10.1109/CSF.2007.19, author = {Andrew Cirillo and Radha Jagadeesan and Corin Pitcher and James Riely}, title = {Do As I SaY! Programmatic Access Control with Explicit Identities}, journal ={Computer Security Foundations Symposium, IEEE}, volume = {0}, year = {2007}, isbn = {0-7695-2819-8}, pages = {16-30}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSF.2007.19}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, }

	RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote	x
	TY - CONF JO - Computer Security Foundations Symposium, IEEE TI - Do As I SaY! Programmatic Access Control with Explicit Identities SN - 0-7695-2819-8 SP16 EP30 A1 - Andrew Cirillo, A1 - Radha Jagadeesan, A1 - Corin Pitcher, A1 - James Riely, PY - 2007 KW - null VL - 0 JA - Computer Security Foundations Symposium, IEEE ER -

Andrew Cirillo, DePaul University

Radha Jagadeesan, DePaul University

Corin Pitcher, DePaul University

James Riely, DePaul University

DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSF.2007.19

We address the programmatic realization of the access control model of security in distributed systems. Our aim is to bridge the gap between abstract/declarative policies and their concrete/operational implementations.

We present a programming formalism (which extends the asynchronous pi-calculus with explicit principals) and a specification logic (which extends Datalog with primitives from authorization logic). We provide two kinds of static analysis methods to tie implementation to specification. Type checking determines that a program is a sound implementation of policy; i.e., that all granted accesses are safe in the face of arbitrary opponents. Model checking determines a degree of completeness; i.e., that accesses permitted by the policy are actually granted in the implementation.

Citation:

Andrew Cirillo, Radha Jagadeesan, Corin Pitcher, James Riely, "Do As I SaY! Programmatic Access Control with Explicit Identities," csf, pp.16-30, 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'07), 2007

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