Ninth IEEE International Symposium on Asynchronous Circuits and Systems (ASYNC'03) An Investigation into the Security of Self-Timed Circuits Vancouver, B.C., Canada May 12-May 15 ISBN: 0-7695-1898-2
Self-timed logic may have advantages for security-sensitive applications. The absence of clock, as reliable timing reference, makes conventional power analysis attacks more difficult. However, the variability of the timing of self-timed circuits is weakness that could be exploited by alternative attack techniques. This paper introduces methodology for the differential power analysis of self-timed circuits which does not rely upon clock signal. This methodology is used to investigate the security of self-timed, ARM-compatible processor designed specifically to explore the benefits of self-timed design in secure applications. Timing analysis is also applied to the same design. The results from the analyses are presented and confirm that self-timed logic with dual-rail encoding and secure storage significantly improves resistance to non-invasive attacks.
Citation:
Z. C. Yu, S. B. Furber, L. A. Plana, "An Investigation into the Security of Self-Timed Circuits," async, pp.206, Ninth IEEE International Symposium on Asynchronous Circuits and Systems (ASYNC'03), 2003 Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||