First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES'06) Evaluation of Network Robustness for Given Defense Resource Allocation Strategies Vienna, Austria April 20-April 22 ISBN: 0-7695-2567-9
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ARES.2006.61
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the effective and efficient protection of critical information infrastructures has become an even more important issue. To enhance network survivability, a network operator needs to invest a fixed amount of budget and distribute it properly. However, a potential attacker will always adjust his attack strategies to compromise a network at minimal cost, if he knows the resource allocation strategy of the network operator. In this paper, we first evaluate the survivability of a given network under two different metrics; that is, we assess the minimal attack cost incurred by an attacker. The two survivability metrics are assumed to be the connectivity of at least one given critical Origin- Destination pair (OD pair) and that of all given critical OD pairs. We then analyze the problem with two optimization-based models, in which the problem structure is, by nature, a mixed integer programming problem.
Citation:
Y.-S. Lin, P.-H. Tsang, C.-H. Chen, C.-L. Tseng, Y.-L. Lin, "Evaluation of Network Robustness for Given Defense Resource Allocation Strategies," ares, pp.182-189, First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES'06), 2006 Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||