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10th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC'04)
Honeypots: Practical Means to Validate Malicious Fault Assumptions
Papeete, Tahiti, French Polynesia
March 03-March 05
ISBN: 0-7695-2076-6
Marc Dacier, Eurecom
Fabien Pouget, Eurecom
Herv? Debar, France T?l?com
In this paper, we report on an experiment run with several honeypots for 4 months. The motivation of this work resides in our wish to use data collected by honeypots to validate fault assumptions required when designing intrusion-tolerant systems. This work in progress establishes the foundations for a feasibility study into that direction. After a review of the state of the art with respect to honeypots, we present our test bed, discuss results obtained and lessons learned Avenues for future work are also proposed.
Citation:
Marc Dacier, Fabien Pouget, Herv? Debar, "Honeypots: Practical Means to Validate Malicious Fault Assumptions," prdc, pp.383-388, 10th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC'04), 2004
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