loading...
 This Article 
   
 Share 
   
 Bibliographic References 
   
 Add to: 
 
Digg
Furl
Spurl
Blink
Simpy
Google
Del.icio.us
Y!MyWeb
 
 Search 
   
23rd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'03)
Protecting BGP Routes to Top Level DNS Servers
Providence, Rhode Island
May 19-May 22
ISBN: 0-7695-1920-2
Lan Wang, UCLA
Xiaoliang Zhao, USC/ISI
Dan Pei, UCLA
Daniel Massey, USC/ISI
Allison Mankin, Bell Labs
S. Felix Wu, UC Davis
The Domain Name System (DNS) is an essential part of the Internet infrastructure and provides fundamental services, such as translating host names into IP addresses for Internet communication. The DNS is vulnerable to a number of potential faults and attacks. In particular, false routing announcements can deny access to the DNS service or redirect DNS queries to a malicious impostor. Due to the hierarchical DNS design, a single fault or attack against the routes to any of the top level DNS servers can disrupt Internet services to millions of users. In this paper we propose a path-filtering approach to protect the routes to the critical top level DNS servers. Our approach exploits the high degree of redundancy in top level DNS servers and also exploits the observation that popular destinations, including top level DNS servers, are well connected via stable routes. Our path-filter restricts the potential top level DNS server route changes to be within a set of established paths. Heuristics derived from routing operations are used to adjust the potential routes over time. We tested our path-filtering design against BGP routing logs and the results show that the design can effectively ensure correct routes to top level DNS servers without impacting DNS service availability.
Index Terms:
fault-tolerance, DNS infrastructure protection, route hijacking, BGP path filtering
Citation:
Lan Wang, Xiaoliang Zhao, Dan Pei, Randy Bush, Daniel Massey, Allison Mankin, S. Felix Wu, Lixia Zhang, "Protecting BGP Routes to Top Level DNS Servers," icdcs, pp.322, 23rd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'03), 2003
Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use.