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15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02)
A Simple View of Type-Secure Information Flow in the π-Calculus
Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada
June 24-June 26
ISBN: 0-7695-1689-0

One way of enforcing an information flow control policy is to use a static type system capable of guaranteeing a noninterference property. Noninterference requires that two processes with distinct "high"-level components, but common "low"-level structure, cannot be distinguished by "low"-level observers. We state this property in terms of a rather strict notion of process equivalence, namely weak barbed reduction congruence.

Because noninterference is not a safety property, it is often regarded as more difficult to establish than a conventional type safety result. This paper aims to provide an elementary noninterference roof in the setting of the π calculus. This is done by reducing the problem to subject reduction "a safety property" for a nonstandard, but fairly natural, extension of the π calculus, baptized the (π)-calculus.

Citation:
François Pottier, "A Simple View of Type-Secure Information Flow in the π-Calculus," csfw, pp.320, 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02), 2002
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