15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02)
A Formal Analysis of Syverson?s Rational Exchange Protocol
Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada
June 24-June 26
ISBN: 0-7695-1689-0
In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of a rational exchange protocol proposed by Syverson. A rational exchange protocol guarantees that misbehavior cannot generate benefits, and is therefore discouraged. The analysis is performed using our formal model, which is based on game theory. In this model, rational exchange is defined in terms of a Nash equilibrium.
Citation:
Levente Buttyán, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Srdjan Capkun, "A Formal Analysis of Syverson?s Rational Exchange Protocol," csfw, pp.193, 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02), 2002