Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage

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28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC'04)

Hong Kong

September 28-September 30

ISBN: 0-7695-2209-2

	ASCII Text	x
	Qianhong Wu, Changjie Wang, Xiaofeng Chen, Yumin Wang, "Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage," Computer Software and Applications Conference, Annual International, vol. 1, pp. 384-389, 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC'04), 2004.

	BibTex	x
	@article{ 10.1109/CMPSAC.2004.1342867, author = {Qianhong Wu and Changjie Wang and Xiaofeng Chen and Yumin Wang}, title = {Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage}, journal ={Computer Software and Applications Conference, Annual International}, volume = {1}, year = {2004}, issn = {0730-3157}, pages = {384-389}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CMPSAC.2004.1342867}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, }

	RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote	x
	TY - CONF JO - Computer Software and Applications Conference, Annual International TI - Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage SN - 0730-3157 SP384 EP389 A1 - Qianhong Wu, A1 - Changjie Wang, A1 - Xiaofeng Chen, A1 - Yumin Wang, PY - 2004 KW - null VL - 1 JA - Computer Software and Applications Conference, Annual International ER -

Qianhong Wu, Xidian University

Changjie Wang, Chinese University of Hong Kong

Xiaofeng Chen, Sun Yat-sen University

Yumin Wang, Xidian University

DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CMPSAC.2004.1342867

Publicly verifiable sealed electronic auctions are proposed. The schemes enjoy the following advantages. They require no special trusted parties. After bid opening phase, only the winning price is revealed and the relation of other bidding amounts keep unknown. The winning price is publicly verifiable. Our scheme supports the first-price auction, Vickrey auction and (M+1)st-price auction. Finally, the first-price auction is very efficient and the generic (M+1)st-price auction is applicable when a high standard of security is required.

Citation:

Qianhong Wu, Changjie Wang, Xiaofeng Chen, Yumin Wang, "Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage," compsac, vol. 1, pp.384-389, 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC'04), 2004

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