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12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '96)
Proxies For Anonymous Routing
San Diego California
December 09-December 13
ISBN: 0-8186-7606-X
ASCII Text
x 
 
M.G. Reed, P.F. Syverson, D.M. Goldschlag, "Proxies For Anonymous Routing," Computer Security Applications Conference, Annual, pp. 95, 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '96), 1996.
 
 
BibTex
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@article{ 10.1109/CSAC.1996.569678,
author = {M.G. Reed and P.F. Syverson and D.M. Goldschlag},
title = {Proxies For Anonymous Routing},
journal ={Computer Security Applications Conference, Annual},
volume = {0},
year = {1996},
issn = {1063-9527},
pages = {95},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569678},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
x 
 
TY - CONF
JO - Computer Security Applications Conference, Annual
TI - Proxies For Anonymous Routing
SN - 1063-9527
SP
EP
A1 - M.G. Reed,
A1 - P.F. Syverson,
A1 - D.M. Goldschlag,
PY - 1996
KW - telecommunication network routing; proxies; anonymous routing; network traffic analysis-resistant method; public network; flexible communications infrastructure; onion routing; unmodified Internet services; Sun Solaris 2.4; World Wide Web browsing; HTTP; remote logins; electronic mail; SMTP; file transfers; FTP; application-independent real-time bi-directional anonymous connections; eavesdropping; user anonymity; anonymous connections; identifying information; packet-switched public network
VL - 0
JA - Computer Security Applications Conference, Annual
ER -
 
M.G. Reed, Center for High Assurance Comput. Syst., Naval Res. Lab., Washington, DC, USA
P.F. Syverson, Center for High Assurance Comput. Syst., Naval Res. Lab., Washington, DC, USA
D.M. Goldschlag, Center for High Assurance Comput. Syst., Naval Res. Lab., Washington, DC, USA
Using traffic analysis, it is possible to infer who is talking to whom over a public network. This paper describes a flexible communications infrastructure, called onion routing, which is resistant to traffic analysis. Onion routing lies just beneath the application layer, and is designed to interface with a wide variety of unmodified Internet services by means of proxies. Onion routing has been implemented on a Sun Solaris 2.4; in addition, proxies for World Wide Web browsing (HTTP), remote logins (RLOGIN), e-mail (SMTP) and file transfers (FTP) have been implemented. Onion routing provides application-independent, real-time and bi-directional anonymous connections that are resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Applications making use of onion routing's anonymous connections may (and usually should) identify their users over the anonymous connection. User anonymity may be layered on top of the anonymous connections by removing identifying information from the data stream. Our goal is anonymous connections, not anonymous communication. The use of a packet-switched public network should not automatically reveal who is talking to whom; this is the traffic analysis that onion routing complicates.
Index Terms:
telecommunication network routing; proxies; anonymous routing; network traffic analysis-resistant method; public network; flexible communications infrastructure; onion routing; unmodified Internet services; Sun Solaris 2.4; World Wide Web browsing; HTTP; remote logins; electronic mail; SMTP; file transfers; FTP; application-independent real-time bi-directional anonymous connections; eavesdropping; user anonymity; anonymous connections; identifying information; packet-switched public network
Citation:
M.G. Reed, P.F. Syverson, D.M. Goldschlag, "Proxies For Anonymous Routing," acsac, pp.95, 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '96), 1996
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