Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3 (AAMAS'04) New York City, New York, USA July 19-July 23 ISBN: 0-7695-2092-8
Individual rationality limits the ability of decison makers to accommodate group behavior where coordination is required. By replacing the asocial policy of doing the best thing possible for the individual with a mathematically precise notion of being "good enough," satisficing game theory provides a framework with which to synthesize artificial multiagent societies that are designed to cooperate.
Citation:
Wynn C. Stirling, "A Sociological Framework for Multiagent Systems," aamas, vol. 3, pp.1292-1293, Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3 (AAMAS'04), 2004 Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||