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Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1 (AAMAS'04)
Approximate Solutions for Partially Observable Stochastic Games with Common Payoffs
New York City, New York, USA
July 19-July 23
ISBN: 0-7695-2092-8
Rosemary Emery-Montemerlo, Carnegie Mellon University
Geoff Gordon, Carnegie Mellon University
Jeff Schneider, Carnegie Mellon University
Sebastian Thrun, Stanford University
Partially observable decentralized decision making in robot teams is fundamentally different from decision making in fully observable problems. Team members cannot simply apply single-agent solution techniques in parallel. Instead, we must turn to game theoretic frameworks to correctly model the problem. While partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) provide a solution model for decentralized robot teams, this model quickly becomes intractable. We propose an algorithm that approximates POSGs as a series of smaller, related Bayesian games, using heuristics such as QMDP to provide the future discounted value of actions. This algorithm trades off limited look-ahead in uncertainty for computational feasibility, and results in policies that are locally optimal with respect to the selected heuristic. Empirical results are provided for both a simple problem for which the full POSG can also be constructed, as well as more complex, robot-inspired, problems.
Citation:
Rosemary Emery-Montemerlo, Geoff Gordon, Jeff Schneider, Sebastian Thrun, "Approximate Solutions for Partially Observable Stochastic Games with Common Payoffs," aamas, vol. 1, pp.136-143, Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1 (AAMAS'04), 2004
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