Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1 (AAMAS'04)
Approximate Solutions for Partially Observable Stochastic Games with Common Payoffs
New York City, New York, USA
July 19-July 23
ISBN: 0-7695-2092-8
Partially observable decentralized decision making in robot teams is fundamentally different from decision making in fully observable problems. Team members cannot simply apply single-agent solution techniques in parallel. Instead, we must turn to game theoretic frameworks to correctly model the problem. While partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) provide a solution model for decentralized robot teams, this model quickly becomes intractable. We propose an algorithm that approximates POSGs as a series of smaller, related Bayesian games, using heuristics such as QMDP to provide the future discounted value of actions. This algorithm trades off limited look-ahead in uncertainty for computational feasibility, and results in policies that are locally optimal with respect to the selected heuristic. Empirical results are provided for both a simple problem for which the full POSG can also be constructed, as well as more complex, robot-inspired, problems.
Citation:
Rosemary Emery-Montemerlo, Geoff Gordon, Jeff Schneider, Sebastian Thrun, "Approximate Solutions for Partially Observable Stochastic Games with Common Payoffs," aamas, vol. 1, pp.136-143, Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1 (AAMAS'04), 2004