Issue No.11 - November (2005 vol.31)
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TSE.2005.120
Information about calls to the operating system (or kernel libraries) made by a binary executable may be used to determine whether the binary is malicious. Being aware of this approach, malicious programmers hide this information by making such calls without using the call instruction. For instance, the call addr instruction may be replaced by two push instructions and a ret instruction, the first push pushes the address of instruction after the ret instruction, and the second push pushes the address addr. The code may be further obfuscated by spreading the three instructions and by splitting each instruction into multiple instructions. This work presents a method to statically detect obfuscated calls in binary code. The idea is to use abstract interpretation to detect where the normal call-ret convention is violated. These violations can be detected by what is called an abstract stack graph. An abstract stack graph is a concise representation of all potential abstract stacks at every point in a program. An abstract stack is used to associate each element in the stack to the instruction that pushes the element. An algorithm for constructing the abstract stack graph is also presented. Methods for using the abstract stack graph are shown to detect eight different obfuscations. The technique is demonstrated by implementing a prototype tool called DOC (Detector for Obfuscated Calls).
Index Terms- Invasive software (viruses, worms), program analysis, validation, obfuscation, abstract stack.
Arun Lakhotia, Eric Uday Kumar, Michael Venable, "A Method for Detecting Obfuscated Calls in Malicious Binaries", IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol.31, no. 11, pp. 955-968, November 2005, doi:10.1109/TSE.2005.120