|
| This Article | ||
| ||
| Share | ||
| Bibliographic References | ||
| Add to: | ||
 Digg  Furl  Spurl  Blink  Simpy  Google  Del.icio.us  Y!MyWeb | ||
| Search | ||
| ||
| ASCII Text | x | ||
| Norman E. Fenton, Martin Neil, "A Strategy for Improving Safety Related Software Engineering Standards," IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 24, no. 11, pp. 1002-1013, November, 1998. | |||
| BibTex | x | ||
| @article{ 10.1109/32.730547, author = {Norman E. Fenton and Martin Neil}, title = {A Strategy for Improving Safety Related Software Engineering Standards}, journal ={IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering}, volume = {24}, number = {11}, issn = {0098-5589}, year = {1998}, pages = {1002-1013}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/32.730547}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, } | |||
| RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote | x | ||
| TY - JOUR JO - IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering TI - A Strategy for Improving Safety Related Software Engineering Standards IS - 11 SN - 0098-5589 SP1002 EP1013 EPD - 1002-1013 A1 - Norman E. Fenton, A1 - Martin Neil, PY - 1998 KW - Standards KW - IEC1508 KW - safety-critical KW - measurement KW - prediction KW - assessment. VL - 24 JA - IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering ER - | |||
Abstract—There are many standards which are relevant for building safety or mission critical software systems. An effective standard is one that should help developers, assessors, and users of such systems. For developers the standard should help them build the system cost-effectively, and it should be clear what is required in order to conform to the standard. For assessors it should be possible to determine, objectively, compliance to the standard. Users and society at large should have some assurance that a system developed to the standard has quantified risks and benefits. Unfortunately, the existing standards do not adequately fulfill any of these varied requirements. We explain why standards are the way they are and then provide a strategy for improving them. Our approach is to evaluate standards on a number of key criteria that enable us to interpret the standard, identify its scope, and check the ease with which it can be applied and checked. We also need to demonstrate that the use of a standard is likely either to deliver reliable and safe systems at an acceptable cost or help predict reliability and safety accurately. Throughout the paper we examine, by example, a specific standard for safety critical systems (namely IEC 1508) and show how it can be improved by applying our strategy.
[1] A.J. Albrecht, "Measuring Application Development," Proc. IBM Applications Development Joint SHARE/GUIDE Symp.,Monterey Calif., pp. 83-92, 1979.
[2] British Standards Institute, Specification for Safety Requirements for Pushchairs, BS 4792, British Standards Inst. 1984.
[3] ESPRIT Project 22187 SafEty and Risk Evaluation Using Bayesian Nets, 1996. http://www.hugin.dkserene/
[4] N. Fenton and L. Pfleeger, Software Metrics–A Rigorous and Practical Approach, second ed. Boston, PWS-Publishing, 1997.
[5] N.E. Fenton, B. Littlewood, and S. Page, "Evaluating Software Engineering Standards and Methods, in Software Engineering: A European Perspective, T.R. McGettrick AD, ed., IEEE CS Press, pp. 463-470, 1993.
[6] N.E. Fenton, S. Lawrence Pfleeger, and R. Glass, “Science and Substance: A Challenge to Software Engineers,” IEEE Software, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 86–95, July 1994.
[7] Health and Safety Executive, UK, "The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations," HMSO, 1992.
[8] International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), "Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Systems: Generic Aspects, IEC 1508, 1996.
[9] International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), "Software for Computers in the Application of Industrial Safety Related Systems," IEC 65A, 1992.
[10] IEEE ed., "Software Engineering Standards (third edition),"New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 1991.
[11] IEEE, "Standard 1003.1: Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX)-Part 1: System Application: Program Interface (API) [C Language]," (1-55937-061-0), IEEE Computer Society, 1990.
[12] B. Littlewood, M. Neil, and G. Ostrolenk, "Uncertainty in Software-Intensive Systems," High Integrity Systems J., vol. 1 no. 5, pp. 407-413, 1996.
[13] L. Cullen, "The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, HMSO, 1990.
[14] Ministry of Defence Directorate of Standardisation, "Interim Defence Standard 00-55: The Procurement of Safety Critical Software in Defence Equipment; Parts 1-2," Kentigern House, Glasgow, 1991.
[15] M. Neil and N.E. Fenton, "Predicting Software Quality Using Bayesian Belief Networks," Proc 21st Ann. Software Eng. Workshop, NASA Goddard Space Flight Centre, pp. 217-230, Dec 1996.
[16] M. Neil, B. Littlewood, and N.E. Fenton, "Applying Bayesian Belief Networks to Systems Dependability Assessment," Proc. Safety Critical Systems Club Symp., Leeds, pp. 71-93, Springer-Verlag, Feb. 1996.
[17] S. Lawrence Pfleeger, N.E. Fenton, and P. Page, "Evaluating Software Engineering Standards," Computer, vol. 27, no. 9, pp. 71-79, Sept. 1994.
[18] Requirements and Technical Concepts for Aviation, Inc. (RTCA), "Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification," DO-178B, Washington DC, 1992.
[19] R. Shaw, "Safety Cases: How Did We Get Here?" Safety and Reliability of Software Based Systems, 12th Ann. CSR Workshop, R. Shaw, ed., London: Springer-Verlag, pp. 43-95, 1995.