Adam Skillen , Carleton University, Ottawa and Concordia University, Montreal
Mohammad Mannan , Concordia University, Montreal
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TDSC.2013.56
Data confidentiality can be effectively preserved through encryption. In certain situations, this is inadequate, as users may be coerced into disclosing their decryption keys. Steganographic techniques and deniable encryption algorithms have been devised to hide the very existence of encrypted data. We examine the feasibility and efficacy of deniable encryption for mobile devices. To address obstacles that can compromise plausibly deniable encryption (PDE) in a mobile environment, we design a system called Mobiflage. Mobiflage enables PDE on mobile devices by hiding encrypted volumes within random data in a device&#8217;s free storage space. We leverage lessons learned from deniable encryption in the desktop environment, and design new countermeasures for threats specific to mobile systems. We provide two implementations for the Android OS, to assess the feasibility and performance of Mobiflage on different hardware profiles. MF-SD is designed for use on devices with FAT32 removable SD cards. Our MF-MTP variant supports devices that instead share a single internal partition for both apps and user accessible data. MF-MTP leverages certain Ext4 file system mechanisms and uses an adjusted data-block allocator. These new techniques for storing hidden volumes in Ext4 file systems can also be applied to other file systems to enable deniable encryption for desktop OSes and other mobile platforms.
Mobile Computing, Security and Privacy Protection, Data Encryption
Adam Skillen, Mohammad Mannan, "Mobiflage: Deniable Storage Encryption for Mobile Devices", IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, , no. 1, pp. 1, PrePrints PrePrints, doi:10.1109/TDSC.2013.56