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Formal Analysis of Secure Neighbor Discovery in Wireless Networks
Nov.-Dec. 2013 (vol. 10 no. 6)
pp. 355-367
Marcin Poturalski, Swiss Fed. Inst. of Technol. in Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Panos Papadimitratos, R. Inst. of Technol., Stockholm, Sweden
Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Swiss Fed. Inst. of Technol. in Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
We develop a formal framework for the analysis of security protocols in wireless networks. The framework captures characteristics necessary to reason about neighbor discovery protocols, such as the neighbor relation, device location, and message propagation time. We use this framework to establish general results about the possibility of neighbor discovery. In particular, we show that time-based protocols cannot in general provide secure neighbor discovery. Given this insight, we also use the framework to prove the security of four concrete neighbor discovery protocols, including two novel time-and-location-based protocols. We mechanize the model and some proofs in the theorem prover Isabelle.
Index Terms:
telecommunication security,protocols,radio networks,formal analysis,time-and-location-based protocols,time-based protocols,message propagation time,device location,neighbor relation,neighbor discovery protocols,security protocols,wireless networks,secure neighbor discovery,Wireless networks,Formal verification,Knowledge discovery,Computer security,Security of data,distance bounding,Neighbor discovery,relay attack,formal verification
Citation:
Marcin Poturalski, Panos Papadimitratos, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, "Formal Analysis of Secure Neighbor Discovery in Wireless Networks," IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 355-367, Nov.-Dec. 2013, doi:10.1109/TDSC.2013.17
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