CSDL Home IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 2011 vol.8 Issue No.01 - January-February
Issue No.01 - January-February (2011 vol.8)
Henrique Moniz , Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa
Nuno Ferreira Neves , Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa
Miguel Correia , Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa
Paulo Verissimo , Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TDSC.2008.76
Randomized agreement protocols have been around for more than two decades. Often assumed to be inefficient due to their high expected communication and computation complexities, they have remained overlooked by the community-at-large as a valid solution for the deployment of fault-tolerant distributed systems. This paper aims to demonstrate that randomization can be a very competitive approach even in hostile environments where arbitrary faults can occur. A stack of randomized intrusion-tolerant protocols is described and its performance evaluated under several settings in both local-area-network (LAN) and wide-area-network environments. The stack provides a set of relevant services ranging from basic communication primitives up to atomic broadcast. The experimental evaluation shows that the protocols are efficient, especially in LAN environments where no performance reduction is observed under certain Byzantine faults.
Intrusion tolerance, Byzantine agreement, randomized protocols, performance evaluation.
Henrique Moniz, Nuno Ferreira Neves, Miguel Correia, Paulo Verissimo, "RITAS: Services for Randomized Intrusion Tolerance", IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol.8, no. 1, pp. 122-136, January-February 2011, doi:10.1109/TDSC.2008.76