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Dealing with Selfishness and Moral Hazard in Noncooperative Wireless Networks
March 2010 (vol. 9 no. 3)
pp. 420-434
ASCII Text
x 
 
Yanwei Wu, Shaojie Tang, Ping Xu, Xiang-Yang Li, "Dealing with Selfishness and Moral Hazard in Noncooperative Wireless Networks," IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 420-434, March, 2010.
 
 
BibTex
x
 
@article{ 10.1109/TMC.2009.142,
author = {Yanwei Wu and Shaojie Tang and Ping Xu and Xiang-Yang Li},
title = {Dealing with Selfishness and Moral Hazard in Noncooperative Wireless Networks},
journal ={IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing},
volume = {9},
number = {3},
issn = {1536-1233},
year = {2010},
pages = {420-434},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TMC.2009.142},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
x 
 
TY - JOUR
JO - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
TI - Dealing with Selfishness and Moral Hazard in Noncooperative Wireless Networks
IS - 3
SN - 1536-1233
SP420
EP434
EPD - 420-434
A1 - Yanwei Wu,
A1 - Shaojie Tang,
A1 - Ping Xu,
A1 - Xiang-Yang Li,
PY - 2010
KW - Noncooperative networks
KW - reliability
KW - hidden action
KW - hidden information
KW - selfish
KW - truthful
KW - mechanism.
VL - 9
JA - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
ER -
 
Yanwei Wu, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago
Shaojie Tang, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago
Ping Xu, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago
Xiang-Yang Li, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago
For noncooperative networks in which each node is a selfish agent, certain incentives must be given to intermediate nodes to let them forward the data for others. What makes the scenario worse is that, in a multihop noncooperative network, the end points can only observe whether or not the end-to-end transaction was successful or not, but not the individual actions of intermediate nodes. Thus, in the absence of properly designed incentive schemes, rational and selfish intermediate nodes may choose to forward data packets at a very low priority or simply drop the packets, and they could put the blame on the unreliable channel. In this paper, assuming the receiver is a trusted authority, we propose several methods that discourage the hidden actions under hidden information in multihop noncooperative networks with high probability. We design several algorithmic mechanisms for a number of routing scenarios such that each selfish agent will maximize its expected utility (i.e., profit) when it truthfully declares its type (i.e., cost and its actions) and it truthfully follows its declared actions. Our simulations show that the payments by our mechanisms are only slightly larger than the actual cost incurred by all intermediate nodes.

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Index Terms:
Noncooperative networks, reliability, hidden action, hidden information, selfish, truthful, mechanism.
Citation:
Yanwei Wu, Shaojie Tang, Ping Xu, Xiang-Yang Li, "Dealing with Selfishness and Moral Hazard in Noncooperative Wireless Networks," IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 420-434, March 2010, doi:10.1109/TMC.2009.142
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