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Issue No.08 - August (2009 vol.8)
pp: 1009-1022
Dusit Niyato , Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Ekram Hossain , University of Manitoba, Winnipeg
Zhu Han , University of Houston, Houston
ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of spectrum trading with multiple licensed users (i.e., primary users) selling spectrum opportunities to multiple unlicensed users (i.e., secondary users). The secondary users can adapt the spectrum buying behavior (i.e., evolve) by observing the variations in price and quality of spectrum offered by the different primary users or primary service providers. The primary users or primary service providers can adjust their behavior in selling the spectrum opportunities to secondary users to achieve the highest utility. In this paper, we model the evolution and the dynamic behavior of secondary users using the theory of evolutionary game. An algorithm for the implementation of the evolution process of a secondary user is also presented. To model the competition among the primary users, a noncooperative game is formulated where the Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution (in terms of size of offered spectrum to the secondary users and spectrum price). For a primary user, an iterative algorithm for strategy adaptation to achieve the solution is presented. The proposed game-theoretic framework for modeling the interactions among multiple primary users (or service providers) and multiple secondary users is used to investigate network dynamics under different system parameter settings and under system perturbation.
INDEX TERMS
Cognitive radio, dynamic spectrum sharing, spectrum trading, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary equilibrium, replicator dynamics.
CITATION
Dusit Niyato, Ekram Hossain, Zhu Han, "Dynamics of Multiple-Seller and Multiple-Buyer Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Game-Theoretic Modeling Approach", IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol.8, no. 8, pp. 1009-1022, August 2009, doi:10.1109/TMC.2008.157
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