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Issue No.04 - April (2009 vol.21)
pp: 554-567
Arvind K. Tripathi , University of Washington Business School, Seattle
Suresh K. Nair , University of Connecticut, Storrrs
Gilbert G. Karuga , University of Kansas, Lawrence
ABSTRACT
This study proposes methods for determining the optimal lot sizes for sequential auctions that are conducted to sell sizable quantities of an item. These auctions are fairly common in business to consumer (B2C) auctions. In these auctions, the tradeoff for the auctioneer is between the alacrity with which funds are received, and the amount of funds collected by the faster clearing of inventory using larger lot sizes. Observed bids in these auctions impact the auctioneer
INDEX TERMS
Internet Applications, Miscellaneous, Electronic Commerce, Emerging knowledge and data engineering applications (electronic commerce)
CITATION
Arvind K. Tripathi, Suresh K. Nair, Gilbert G. Karuga, "Optimal Lot Sizing Policies For Sequential Online Auctions", IEEE Transactions on Knowledge & Data Engineering, vol.21, no. 4, pp. 554-567, April 2009, doi:10.1109/TKDE.2008.145
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