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Costas Busch, Rajgopal Kannan, Athanasios V. Vasilakos, "Approximating Congestion + Dilation in Networks via "Quality of Routing” Games," IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 61, no. 9, pp. 12701283, Sept., 2012.  
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@article{ 10.1109/TC.2011.145, author = {Costas Busch and Rajgopal Kannan and Athanasios V. Vasilakos}, title = {Approximating Congestion + Dilation in Networks via "Quality of Routing” Games}, journal ={IEEE Transactions on Computers}, volume = {61}, number = {9}, issn = {00189340}, year = {2012}, pages = {12701283}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TC.2011.145}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, }  
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote  x  
TY  JOUR JO  IEEE Transactions on Computers TI  Approximating Congestion + Dilation in Networks via "Quality of Routing” Games IS  9 SN  00189340 SP1270 EP1283 EPD  12701283 A1  Costas Busch, A1  Rajgopal Kannan, A1  Athanasios V. Vasilakos, PY  2012 KW  Algorithmic game theory KW  congestion game KW  routing game KW  Nash equilibrium KW  price of anarchy. VL  61 JA  IEEE Transactions on Computers ER   
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