Issue No.08 - Aug. (2012 vol.61)
Andrey Bogdanov , Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TC.2011.140
The problem of extracting the highest possible amount of key-related information using the lowest possible number of measurements is one of the central questions in side-channel attacks against embedded implementations of cryptographic algorithms. To address it, this work proposes a novel framework enhancing side-channel collision attacks with divide-and-conquer attacks such as differential power analysis (DPA). An information-theoretical metric is introduced for the evaluation of collision detection efficiency. Improved methods of dimension reduction for side-channel traces are developed based on a statistical model of euclidean distance. Experimental results confirm that DPA-combined collision attacks are superior to both DPA-only and collision-only attacks. The new methods of dimension reduction lead to further complexity improvements. All attacks are treated for the case of AES-128 and are practically validated on a widespread 8-bit RISC microcontroller.
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity, data encryption, cryptographic implementations, physical security, side-channel analysis, collision attacks, AES.
Andrey Bogdanov, "Beyond the Limits of DPA: Combined Side-Channel Collision Attacks", IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol.61, no. 8, pp. 1153-1164, Aug. 2012, doi:10.1109/TC.2011.140