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Ping Xu, XiangYang Li, Shaojie Tang, JiZhong Zhao, "Efficient and Strategyproof Spectrum Allocations in Multichannel Wireless Networks," IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 580593, April, 2011.  
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@article{ 10.1109/TC.2010.241, author = {Ping Xu and XiangYang Li and Shaojie Tang and JiZhong Zhao}, title = {Efficient and Strategyproof Spectrum Allocations in Multichannel Wireless Networks}, journal ={IEEE Transactions on Computers}, volume = {60}, number = {4}, issn = {00189340}, year = {2011}, pages = {580593}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TC.2010.241}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, }  
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote  x  
TY  JOUR JO  IEEE Transactions on Computers TI  Efficient and Strategyproof Spectrum Allocations in Multichannel Wireless Networks IS  4 SN  00189340 SP580 EP593 EPD  580593 A1  Ping Xu, A1  XiangYang Li, A1  Shaojie Tang, A1  JiZhong Zhao, PY  2011 KW  Wireless networks KW  spectrum KW  disk graph KW  interval graph KW  PTAS KW  approximation KW  strategyproof. VL  60 JA  IEEE Transactions on Computers ER   
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