|
| This Article | ||
| ||
| Share | ||
| Bibliographic References | ||
| Add to: | ||
 Digg  Furl  Spurl  Blink  Simpy  Google  Del.icio.us  Y!MyWeb | ||
| Search | ||
| ||
15th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE'06)
Security Verification Techniques Applied to PatchLink COTS Software
Manchester, United Kingdom
June 26-June 28
ISBN: 0-7695-2623-3
| ASCII Text | x | ||
| David P. Gilliam, John D. Powell, Matt Bishop, Chris Andrew, Sameer Jog, "Security Verification Techniques Applied to PatchLink COTS Software," 2012 IEEE 21st International Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises, pp. 319-325, 15th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE'06), 2006. | |||
| BibTex | x | ||
| @article{ 10.1109/WETICE.2006.59, author = {David P. Gilliam and John D. Powell and Matt Bishop and Chris Andrew and Sameer Jog}, title = {Security Verification Techniques Applied to PatchLink COTS Software}, journal ={2012 IEEE 21st International Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises}, volume = {0}, year = {2006}, issn = {1524-4547}, pages = {319-325}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/WETICE.2006.59}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, } | |||
| RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote | x | ||
| TY - CONF JO - 2012 IEEE 21st International Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises TI - Security Verification Techniques Applied to PatchLink COTS Software SN - 1524-4547 SP319 EP325 A1 - David P. Gilliam, A1 - John D. Powell, A1 - Matt Bishop, A1 - Chris Andrew, A1 - Sameer Jog, PY - 2006 KW - null VL - 0 JA - 2012 IEEE 21st International Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises ER - | |||
Verification of the security of software artifacts is a challenging task. An integrated approach that combines verification techniques can increase the confidence in the security of software artifacts. Such an approach has been developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the University of California at Davis (UC Davis). Two security verification instruments were developed and then piloted on PatchLink?s UNIX Agent, a Commercial- Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software product, to assess the value of the instruments and the approach. The two instruments are the Flexible Modeling Framework (FMF) -- a model-based verification instrument (JPL), and a Property-Based Tester (UC Davis). Security properties were formally specified for the COTS artifact and then verified using these instruments. The results were then reviewed to determine the effectiveness of the approach and the security of the COTS product.
Citation:
David P. Gilliam, John D. Powell, Matt Bishop, Chris Andrew, Sameer Jog, "Security Verification Techniques Applied to PatchLink COTS Software," wetice, pp.319-325, 15th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE'06), 2006
Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use.