May 6, 1996 to May 8, 1996
Traditionally, cryptography and its applications are defensive in nature, and provide privacy, authentication, and security to users. In this paper we present the idea of ``Cryptovirology'' which employs a twist on cryptography, showing that it can also be used offensively. By being offensive we mean that it can be used to mount extortion based attacks that cause loss of access to information, loss of confidentiality, and information leakage, tasks which cryptography typically prevents. In this paper we analyze potential threats and attacks that rogue use of cryptography can cause when combined with rogue software (viruses, Trojan horses), and demonstrate them experimentally by presenting an implementation of a ``cryptovirus'' that we have tested (we took careful precautions in the process to insure that the virus remained contained). Public-key cryptography is essential to the attacks that we demonstrate (which we call "cryptovirological attacks''). We also suggest countermeasures and mechanisms to cope with and prevent such attacks. These attacks have implications on how the use of cryptographic tools should be managed and audited in general purpose computing environments, and imply that access to cryptographic tools should be well controlled. The experimental virus demonstrates how cryptographic packages can be condensed into a small space, which may have independent applications (e.g., cryptographic module design in small mobile devices).
Adam Young, Moti Yung, "Cryptovirology: Extortion-Based Security Threats and Countermeasures", SP, 1996, 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 1996, pp. 0129, doi:10.1109/SECPRI.1996.502676