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37th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks
Detecting covert communication on Android
Clearwater Beach, FL, USA USA
October 22-October 25
ISBN: 978-1-4673-1565-4
ASCII Text
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Michael Hansen, Raquel Hill, Seth Wimberly, "Detecting covert communication on Android," 37th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks, pp. 300-303, 37th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks, 2012.
 
 
BibTex
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@article{ 10.1109/LCN.2012.6423634,
author = {Michael Hansen and Raquel Hill and Seth Wimberly},
title = {Detecting covert communication on Android},
journal ={37th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks},
volume = {0},
year = {2012},
issn = {0742-1303},
pages = {300-303},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/LCN.2012.6423634},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
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TY - CONF
JO - 37th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks
TI - Detecting covert communication on Android
SN - 0742-1303
SP300
EP303
A1 - Michael Hansen,
A1 - Raquel Hill,
A1 - Seth Wimberly,
PY - 2012
KW - Vibrations
KW - Smart phones
KW - Androids
KW - Humanoid robots
KW - Detectors
KW - Security
KW - Monitoring
KW - security
KW - Android smartphone
KW - covert communication
VL - 0
JA - 37th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks
ER -
 
Michael Hansen, 150 S. Woodlawn Ave., Bloomington, Indiana University, USA
Raquel Hill, 150 S. Woodlawn Ave., Bloomington, Indiana University, USA
Seth Wimberly, 150 S. Woodlawn Ave., Bloomington, Indiana University, USA
Using covert channels, malicious applications on Android-based smartphones are able to subvert the permission system and share data in a potentially untraceable manner. These channels are easy to exploit today, and have enough bandwidth to transmit sensitive information in real-time between collaborating applications. In this paper, we define and implement an application layer covert communications detector that does not require special permission from the user. We quantify the effect our detector has on channel capacities for malicious applications that wish to remain stealthy. Lastly, we evaluate the robustness of the volume and vibration channels on the Android emulator, HTC G1, and Motorola Droid, as well as characterize the effects of background noise on data loss and transfer rates.
Index Terms:
Vibrations,Smart phones,Androids,Humanoid robots,Detectors,Security,Monitoring,security,Android smartphone,covert communication
Citation:
Michael Hansen, Raquel Hill, Seth Wimberly, "Detecting covert communication on Android," lcn, pp.300-303, 37th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks, 2012
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