Clearwater Beach, FL, USA USA
Oct. 22, 2012 to Oct. 25, 2012
Michael Hansen , 150 S. Woodlawn Ave., Bloomington, Indiana University, USA
Raquel Hill , 150 S. Woodlawn Ave., Bloomington, Indiana University, USA
Seth Wimberly , 150 S. Woodlawn Ave., Bloomington, Indiana University, USA
Using covert channels, malicious applications on Android-based smartphones are able to subvert the permission system and share data in a potentially untraceable manner. These channels are easy to exploit today, and have enough bandwidth to transmit sensitive information in real-time between collaborating applications. In this paper, we define and implement an application layer covert communications detector that does not require special permission from the user. We quantify the effect our detector has on channel capacities for malicious applications that wish to remain stealthy. Lastly, we evaluate the robustness of the volume and vibration channels on the Android emulator, HTC G1, and Motorola Droid, as well as characterize the effects of background noise on data loss and transfer rates.
Vibrations, Smart phones, Androids, Humanoid robots, Detectors, Security, Monitoring, security, Android smartphone, covert communication
Michael Hansen, Raquel Hill, Seth Wimberly, "Detecting covert communication on Android", LCN, 2012, 38th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks, 38th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks 2012, pp. 300-303, doi:10.1109/LCN.2012.6423634