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2010 Ninth International Symposium on Distributed Computing and Applications to Business, Engineering and Science
Model of Traffic Path Choice Based on Game Theory and Induction Mechanism
Hong Kong, China
August 10-August 12
ISBN: 978-0-7695-4110-5
In a traffic system, drivers will always choose paths to maximize their own travel utilities, while in the other side, the system manager endeavors to minimize the overall travel time and reach the most system efficiency. In this paper, an induction mechanism based on game theory is proposed. According to the real traffic data, the manager publishes corrected traffic information initially, and then drivers choose their paths. Both the induction of the manager and the choosing of drivers are fulfilled before drivers enter into the traffic system, which can avoid the congestion drift intrinsically. Behaviors of the manager and drivers are guided by game theory. While achieving Nash equilibrium, both the utilities of both the system and drivers are increased observably. Then, the fact that there is a room for inducing challenges is concluded.
Index Terms:
path choice, induction mechanism, traffic simulation, congestion drift
Citation:
Dongwei Guo, Xinquan Li, Miao Liu, Liming Zhang, "Model of Traffic Path Choice Based on Game Theory and Induction Mechanism," dcabes, pp.495-498, 2010 Ninth International Symposium on Distributed Computing and Applications to Business, Engineering and Science, 2010
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