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15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02)
A Formal Analysis of Syverson?s Rational Exchange Protocol
Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada
June 24-June 26
ISBN: 0-7695-1689-0
| ASCII Text | x | ||
| Levente Buttyán, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Srdjan Capkun, "A Formal Analysis of Syverson?s Rational Exchange Protocol," Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE, pp. 193, 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02), 2002. | |||
| BibTex | x | ||
| @article{ 10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021816, author = {Levente Buttyán and Jean-Pierre Hubaux and Srdjan Capkun}, title = {A Formal Analysis of Syverson?s Rational Exchange Protocol}, journal ={Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE}, volume = {0}, year = {2002}, issn = {1063-6900}, pages = {193}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021816}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, } | |||
| RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote | x | ||
| TY - CONF JO - Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE TI - A Formal Analysis of Syverson?s Rational Exchange Protocol SN - 1063-6900 SP EP A1 - Levente Buttyán, A1 - Jean-Pierre Hubaux, A1 - Srdjan Capkun, PY - 2002 KW - null VL - 0 JA - Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE ER - | |||
In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of a rational exchange protocol proposed by Syverson. A rational exchange protocol guarantees that misbehavior cannot generate benefits, and is therefore discouraged. The analysis is performed using our formal model, which is based on game theory. In this model, rational exchange is defined in terms of a Nash equilibrium.
Citation:
Levente Buttyán, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Srdjan Capkun, "A Formal Analysis of Syverson?s Rational Exchange Protocol," csfw, pp.193, 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02), 2002
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