Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols

Andrew D. Gordon; Alan Jeffrey

doi:10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021808

C
CSFW
2002
15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02)
Abstract - Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols

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15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02)

Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols

Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada

June 24-June 26

ISBN: 0-7695-1689-0

	ASCII Text	x
	Andrew D. Gordon, Alan Jeffrey, "Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols," Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE, pp. 77, 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02), 2002.

	BibTex	x
	@article{ 10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021808, author = {Andrew D. Gordon and Alan Jeffrey}, title = {Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols}, journal ={Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE}, volume = {0}, year = {2002}, issn = {1063-6900}, pages = {77}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021808}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, }

	RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote	x
	TY - CONF JO - Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE TI - Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols SN - 1063-6900 SP EP A1 - Andrew D. Gordon, A1 - Alan Jeffrey, PY - 2002 KW - null VL - 0 JA - Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE ER -

Andrew D. Gordon, Microsoft Research

Alan Jeffrey, DePaul University

DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021808

We present the first type and effect system for proving authenticity properties of security protocols based on asymmetric cryptography. The most significant new features of our type system are: (1) a separation of public types (for data possibly sent to the opponent) from tainted types (for data possibly received from the opponent) via a subtype relation; (2) trust effects, to guarantee that tainted data does not,i n fact, originate from the opponent; and (3) challenge/response types to support a variety of idioms used to guarantee message freshness. We illustrate the applicability of our system via protocol examples.

Citation:

Andrew D. Gordon, Alan Jeffrey, "Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols," csfw, pp.77, 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02), 2002

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