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2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing
Optimal Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders
Vienna, Austria
July 20-July 23
ISBN: 978-0-7695-3755-9
| ASCII Text | x | ||
| Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari, "Optimal Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders," Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05), pp. 74-81, 2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing, 2009. | |||
| BibTex | x | ||
| @article{ 10.1109/CEC.2009.86, author = {Sujit Gujar and Y. Narahari}, title = {Optimal Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders}, journal ={Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05)}, volume = {0}, year = {2009}, isbn = {978-0-7695-3755-9}, pages = {74-81}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CEC.2009.86}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, } | |||
| RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote | x | ||
| TY - CONF JO - Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05) TI - Optimal Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders SN - 978-0-7695-3755-9 SP74 EP81 A1 - Sujit Gujar, A1 - Y. Narahari, PY - 2009 KW - Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) KW - Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC) KW - Individual Rationality (IR) KW - Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction KW - Optimal Mechanism VL - 0 JA - Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05) ER - | |||
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CEC.2009.86
The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions islimited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an optimal auction for procuring multiple units of multiple items when the bidders are single minded. We develop a procurement auction that minimizes the cost ofprocurement while satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. Under appropriate regularity conditions, this optimal auction also satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The results presented here hold true for equivalent forward auction settings as well.
Index Terms:
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC), Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC), Individual Rationality (IR), Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction, Optimal Mechanism
Citation:
Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari, "Optimal Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders," cec, pp.74-81, 2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing, 2009
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