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Return-Oriented Programming
Nov.-Dec. 2012 (vol. 10 no. 6)
pp. 84-87
Marco Prandini, University of Bologna, Italy
Marco Ramilli, University of Bologna, Italy
Attackers able to compromise the memory of a target machine can change its behavior and usually gain complete control over it. Despite the ingenious prevention and protection mechanisms that have been implemented in modern operating systems, memory corruption attacks still account for a big share of the security breaches afflicting software systems. This article describes a growing attack trend that uses return-oriented programming (ROP) techniques to bypass the most common memory protection systems.
Index Terms:
Operating systems,Programming,Computer crime,Computer security,Buffer overflows,operating systems,buffer overflows,attack,ROP,return-oriented programming
Citation:
Marco Prandini, Marco Ramilli, "Return-Oriented Programming," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 84-87, Nov.-Dec. 2012, doi:10.1109/MSP.2012.152
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