Issue No.05 - Sept.-Oct. (2012 vol.10)
pp: 33-41
Philip B. Stark , University of California, Berkeley
David Wagner , University of California, Berkeley
The authors propose an alternative to current requirements for certifying voting equipment and conducting elections. They argue that elections should be structured to provide convincing affirmative evidence that the reported outcomes actually reflect how people voted. This can be accomplished with a combination of software-independent voting systems, compliance audits, and risk-limiting audits. Together, these yield a resilient canvass framework: a fault-tolerant approach to conducting elections that gives strong evidence that the reported outcome is correct or reports that the evidence is not convincing. If evidence-based elections are adopted, certification and testing of voting equipment can be relaxed, saving money and time and reducing barriers to innovation in voting systems—and election integrity will benefit. The authors conclude that there should be more regulation of the evidence trail and less regulation of equipment, and that compliance audits and risk-limiting audits should be required.
Nominations and elections, Security, Seals, Privacy, Software, Electronic voting, Testing, resilient canvass framework, elections, software-independent voting system, risk-limiting audit
Philip B. Stark, David Wagner, "Evidence-Based Elections", IEEE Security & Privacy, vol.10, no. 5, pp. 33-41, Sept.-Oct. 2012, doi:10.1109/MSP.2012.62
1. “Voting Information 2012,” Verified Voting Foundation, 2012; http:/
2. “A Master List of 70+ Voting Machine Failures and Miscounts by State,” Common Cause and VotersUnite!, Jan. 2008; MASTERLISTOFMACHINEFAILURES.pdf .
3. P. McDaniel et al., “EVEREST: Evaluation and Validation of Election-Related Equipment, Standards and Testing,”7 Dec. 2007; .
4. D. Wagner, “Written Testimony of David Wagner, Ph.D., Computer Science Division, University of California, Berkeley, before the Committee on Science and Committee on House Administration, U.S. House of Representatives,”19 July 2006; .
5. “Public Comment on the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Version 1.1,” Accurate, 28 Sept. 2009; 2009/09ACCURATE-vvsgv11-final.pdf .
6. “Public Comment on the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines,” Accurate, 30 Sept. 2005; 2005_vvsg_comment.pdf.
7. D. Mulligan and J.L. Hall, “Preliminary Analysis of E-voting Problems Highlights Need for Heightened Standards and Testing,” Dec. 2004; .
8. E.W. Felten, “Testimony of Edward W. Felten Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs, Princeton University, United States House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration Hearing on Electronic Voting Machines: Verification, Security, and Paper Trails,”28 Sept. 2006; .
9. US Dept. Justice v. ES&S, US District Court for the District of Columbia, case no. 1:10-cv-00380, 3 Mar. 2010; .
10. D. Beirne, “Written Remarks Submitted by David Beirne, Executive Director, to the United States Election Assistance Commission Interdisciplinary Roundtable Discussion on the Proposed Voluntary Voting System Guidelines,”5 May 2008; attachment_download file.
11. H.S. Berger, “Testimony Concerning the TGDC 2007 Draft Revision of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines,”17 Mar. 2008; attachment_download file.
12. “United States Election Assistance Commission Public Meeting: Voting Systems Manufacturer Roundtable Discussion,”29 Feb. 2008; attachment_download file.
13. J. Benaloh et al., “SOBA: Secrecy-Preserving Observable Ballot-Level Audits,” Proc. 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE 11), Usenix Assoc., 2011; soba11.pdf.
14. R. Rivest, “On the Notion of 'Software Independence' in Voting Systems,” Philosophical Trans. Royal Soc. A, vol. 366, no. 1881, 2008, pp. 3759–3767.
15. J. Hall et al., “Implementing Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits in California,” Proc. 2009 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE 09), Usenix Assoc., Aug. 2009; hall.pdf.
16. P. Stark, “Efficient Post-Election Audits of Multiple Contests: 2009 California Tests,” Proc. 2009 Conf. Empirical Legal Studies, 2009; http://ssrn.comabstract=1443314.
17. M. Lindeman and P.B. Stark, “A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 10, no. 5, 2012, pp. 42–49.
18. T. Magrino et al., “Computing the Margin of Victory in IRV Elections,” Proc. 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE 11), Usenix Assoc., 2011; Magrino.pdf.
19. D. Cary, “Estimating The Margin of Victory for Instant-Runoff Voting,” Proc. 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE 11), Usenix Assoc., 2011; Cary8-2-11.pdf.
20. “AB 2023 (Saldaña), Chapter 122 Statutes of 2010 Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program, March 1, 2012, Report to the Legislature,” California Secretary of State, Mar. 2012; risk-pilotreport-to-legislature-3-1-12.pdf .
21. “DRAFT Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program 2011-2012: Step-by-Step Instructions for Conducting Risk-Limiting Audits,” California Secretary of State, 2012; risk-pilotdraft-audit-instructions.pdf.