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Issue No.05 - Sept.-Oct. (2012 vol.10)
pp: 25-32
Richard Buckland , University of New South Wales
Roland Wen , University of New South Wales
ABSTRACT
Australia has a long history of transparent, high-integrity secret ballot elections. As elections are increasingly dependent on electronic systems, the traditions of transparency and privacy must extend to new technologies and ways of scrutinizing them. The Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) is undertaking a project that aims to set the bar for how Australian e-voting systems should be commissioned, developed, and scrutinized. Through collaboration with the Universities of New South Wales, Melbourne, Luxembourg, and Surrey, the VEC is developing the first state government–level universally verifiable public e-voting system in the world, based on Prêt à Voter.
INDEX TERMS
Nominations and elections, Electronic voting, Australia, Cryptography, Privacy, Observers, transparency, e-voting, Australia, elections, preferential voting, security
CITATION
Richard Buckland, Roland Wen, "The Future of E-voting in Australia", IEEE Security & Privacy, vol.10, no. 5, pp. 25-32, Sept.-Oct. 2012, doi:10.1109/MSP.2012.59
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