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Issue No.05 - Sept.-Oct. (2012 vol.10)
pp: 18-24
Aleksander Essex , Chidlren's Hospital of Eastern Ontario Research Institute
Urs Hengartner , University of Waterloo, Canada
ABSTRACT
Hover (Hash-Only Verification), an end-to-end (E2E) verifiable voting system with distributed trust, uses only a collision-resistant hash function for verification. Such verification could make E2E elections more accessible to people without a strong cryptography background.
INDEX TERMS
Nominations and elections, Privacy, Resistance, Reliability, Encryption, E2E, trustworthy elections, cryptographic voting, end-to-end verification, election audits, computer security, Hover, Hash-Only Verification
CITATION
Aleksander Essex, Urs Hengartner, "Hover: Trustworthy Elections with Hash-Only Verification", IEEE Security & Privacy, vol.10, no. 5, pp. 18-24, Sept.-Oct. 2012, doi:10.1109/MSP.2012.63
REFERENCES
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