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Potential Attacks on Onboard Aerospace Systems
July-Aug. 2012 (vol. 10 no. 4)
pp. 71-74
ASCII Text
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Anthony Dessiatnikoff, Yves Deswarte, Éric Alata, Vincent Nicomette, "Potential Attacks on Onboard Aerospace Systems," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 71-74, July-Aug., 2012.
 
 
BibTex
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@article{ 10.1109/MSP.2012.104,
author = {Anthony Dessiatnikoff and Yves Deswarte and Éric Alata and Vincent Nicomette},
title = {Potential Attacks on Onboard Aerospace Systems},
journal ={IEEE Security & Privacy},
volume = {10},
number = {4},
issn = {1540-7993},
year = {2012},
pages = {71-74},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSP.2012.104},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
x 
 
TY - MGZN
JO - IEEE Security & Privacy
TI - Potential Attacks on Onboard Aerospace Systems
IS - 4
SN - 1540-7993
SP71
EP74
EPD - 71-74
A1 - Anthony Dessiatnikoff,
A1 - Yves Deswarte,
A1 - Éric Alata,
A1 - Vincent Nicomette,
PY - 2012
KW - computer security
KW - aerospace computing systems
KW - embedded systems
KW - software vulnerabilities
KW - hardware vulnerabilities
KW - core functions
KW - fault tolerance
VL - 10
JA - IEEE Security & Privacy
ER -
 
Yves Deswarte, LAAS-CNRS
Éric Alata, LAAS-CNRS
Vincent Nicomette, LAAS-CNRS
Because security is becoming a major concern for aircraft manufacturers and satellite makers, vulnerability discovery and countermeasures should be integrated into onboard computing systems early during their development. Attacks against aerospace computer systems fall into two main classes. One aims to corrupt the computing system's core functions; the other targets fault-tolerance mechanisms (error detection and recovery).

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Index Terms:
computer security,aerospace computing systems,embedded systems,software vulnerabilities,hardware vulnerabilities,core functions,fault tolerance
Citation:
Anthony Dessiatnikoff, Yves Deswarte, Éric Alata, Vincent Nicomette, "Potential Attacks on Onboard Aerospace Systems," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 71-74, July-Aug. 2012, doi:10.1109/MSP.2012.104
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