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Issue No.01 - January/February (2010 vol.8)
pp: 43-49
Lutz Wrage , Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University
Peter H. Feiler , Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University
John Morley , Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University
Bruce Lewis , Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University
Jérôme Hugues , Institut Telecom, ParisTech, France
The modeling of system quality attributes, including security, is often done with low-fidelity software models and disjointed architectural specifications by various engineers using their own specialized notations. These models typically aren't maintained or documented throughout the life cycle and make it difficult to obtain a system view. However, a single-source architecture model annotated with analysis-specific information lets designers reflect changes in the various analysis models with little effort. This approach also lets designers conduct adequate trade-off analyses and evaluate architectural variations prior to system realization. This article describes how model-based development using the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) and compatible analysis tools provides the platform for multidimensional, multifidelity analysis and verification.
security, verification, architectural modeling, AADL, Architecture Analysis and Design Language
Lutz Wrage, Peter H. Feiler, John Morley, Bruce Lewis, Jérôme Hugues, "Architectural Modeling to Verify Security and Nonfunctional Behavior", IEEE Security & Privacy, vol.8, no. 1, pp. 43-49, January/February 2010, doi:10.1109/MSP.2009.143
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