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November/December 2009 (vol. 7 no. 6)
pp. 3
Fred B. Schneider, Cornell University
Using exams to create labels for our workforce might sound like a way to get more trustworthy systems, but it's not. If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a duck, then there's good reason to believe that it's a duck. But you don't get a duck just by calling something a duck, and you don't get trustworthy systems simply by introducing a labeling scheme for system-builders. You can't label-in security. To have the desired effect, a credential must bestow obligations and responsibilities on practitioners.
Index Terms:
certification, security, trusted computing
Citation:
Fred B. Schneider, "Labeling-in Security," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 3, Nov.-Dec. 2009, doi:10.1109/MSP.2009.180
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