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Issue No.03 - May/June (2008 vol.6)
pp: 40-46
Aleks Essex , University of Ottawa
Richard Carback , University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Jeremy Clark , University of Waterloo
Stefan Popoveniuc , George Washington University
Alan Sherman , University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Poorvi Vora , George Washington University
Scantegrity is a security enhancement for optical scan voting systems. It's part of an emerging class of "end-to-end" independent election verification systems that permit each voter to verify that his or her ballot was correctly recorded and counted. On the Scantegrity ballot, each candidate position is paired with a random letter. Election officials confirm receipt of the ballot by posting the letter that is adjacent to the marked position. Scantegrity is the first voting system to offer strong independent verification without changing the way voters mark optical scan ballots, and it complies with legislative proposals requiring "unencrypted" paper audit records.
e-voting, electronic voting, optical scan ballots, election procedures, David Chaum, security
David Chaum, Aleks Essex, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Stefan Popoveniuc, Alan Sherman, Poorvi Vora, "Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting", IEEE Security & Privacy, vol.6, no. 3, pp. 40-46, May/June 2008, doi:10.1109/MSP.2008.70
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