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Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
May/June 2008 (vol. 6 no. 3)
pp. 40-46
ASCII Text
x 
 
David Chaum, Aleks Essex, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Stefan Popoveniuc, Alan Sherman, Poorvi Vora, "Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 40-46, May/June, 2008.
 
 
BibTex
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@article{ 10.1109/MSP.2008.70,
author = {David Chaum and Aleks Essex and Richard Carback and Jeremy Clark and Stefan Popoveniuc and Alan Sherman and Poorvi Vora},
title = {Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting},
journal ={IEEE Security & Privacy},
volume = {6},
number = {3},
issn = {1540-7993},
year = {2008},
pages = {40-46},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSP.2008.70},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
x 
 
TY - MGZN
JO - IEEE Security & Privacy
TI - Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IS - 3
SN - 1540-7993
SP40
EP46
EPD - 40-46
A1 - David Chaum,
A1 - Aleks Essex,
A1 - Richard Carback,
A1 - Jeremy Clark,
A1 - Stefan Popoveniuc,
A1 - Alan Sherman,
A1 - Poorvi Vora,
PY - 2008
KW - e-voting
KW - electronic voting
KW - optical scan ballots
KW - election procedures
KW - David Chaum
KW - security
VL - 6
JA - IEEE Security & Privacy
ER -
 
Aleks Essex, University of Ottawa
Richard Carback, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Jeremy Clark, University of Waterloo
Stefan Popoveniuc, George Washington University
Alan Sherman, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Poorvi Vora, George Washington University
Scantegrity is a security enhancement for optical scan voting systems. It's part of an emerging class of "end-to-end" independent election verification systems that permit each voter to verify that his or her ballot was correctly recorded and counted. On the Scantegrity ballot, each candidate position is paired with a random letter. Election officials confirm receipt of the ballot by posting the letter that is adjacent to the marked position. Scantegrity is the first voting system to offer strong independent verification without changing the way voters mark optical scan ballots, and it complies with legislative proposals requiring "unencrypted" paper audit records.

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Index Terms:
e-voting, electronic voting, optical scan ballots, election procedures, David Chaum, security
Citation:
David Chaum, Aleks Essex, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Stefan Popoveniuc, Alan Sherman, Poorvi Vora, "Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 40-46, May-June 2008, doi:10.1109/MSP.2008.70
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