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Issue No.01 - January-March (2008 vol.7)
pp: 30-39
Daniel Halperin , University of Washington
Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin , University of Massachusetts Amherst
Kevin Fu , University of Massachusetts Amherst
Tadayoshi Kohno , University of Washington
William H. Maisel , Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Harvard Medical School
ABSTRACT
Implantable medical devices, such as pacemakers and implantable cardiac defibrillators, can save lives and greatly improve a patient’s quality of life. As the use of wireless IMDs increases and as these devices begin to interoperate in vivo, the need to address IMD security and patient privacy under adversarial conditions will increase. A new framework for evaluating the security and privacy of wireless IMDs attempts to balance the tensions between these goals and traditional IMD design goals such as safety and utility. Proposed research directions can help mitigate conflicts between these goals, but solutions will require design trade-offs and the collective expertise of the medical community, security community, and regulatory bodies. This article is part of a special issue on implantable electronics.
INDEX TERMS
medical safety, implantable medical devices, security, privacy, pervasive computing
CITATION
Daniel Halperin, Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin, Kevin Fu, Tadayoshi Kohno, William H. Maisel, "Security and Privacy for Implantable Medical Devices", IEEE Pervasive Computing, vol.7, no. 1, pp. 30-39, January-March 2008, doi:10.1109/MPRV.2008.16
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